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THE POLITICS OF VICTIMIZATION MAKES
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS
Jennifer L. Hochschild*

THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS. By Kristin Bumiller. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press. 1988. Pp. x, 161. $19.95.
PLURAL BUT EQUAL: BLACKS AND MINORITIES IN AMERICA'S PLU·
RAL SOCIETY. By Harold Cruse. New York: William Morrow & Co.
1987. Pp. 420. $22.95.
One of the main rewards of studying race in America is that racial
politics constantly overturns conventional assumptions about "what
goes with what." We usually think we know how left- and rightwingers differ on politically salient issues. We further assume that, at
least among well educated people, 1 knowing a person's view on one
issue enables us to predict his or her views on similar issues. People
who seek liberation for African-Americans also seek liberation for women, opposed the Vietnam War, and are sympathetic to political and
economic refugees from Third World nations - or so we assume.
Conversely, people who assert that poor black women participate in
their own victimization seldom promote radical reform of the legal
system - or so we assume. The two books under review here have
little in common, but they share the great virtue of forcing us to reconsider such assumptions. This strength is so great, in fact, that it may
outweigh the flaws in style and substance that unfortunately permeate
both books. Because their argument and tone differ, I will first consider them separately, then return to their common unsettling properties in the final section of the review.
Kristin Bumiller's book, The Civil Rights Society, focuses on "the
social construction of victims" by examining how antidiscrimination
law harms the people it is intended to benefit. The book's "central
point"
is that antidiscrimination ideology [as articulated in contemporary civil
rights law] may serve to reinforce the victimization of women and racial
• Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, Princeton University. B.A. 1971, Oberlin College;
Ph.D. (Political Science) 1979, Yale University. - Ed.
1. Ever ·since Philip Converse published The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics (in
IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT (D. Apter ed. 1964)), we have been unable to assume that very
many people, especially those without a college education, are ideologically constrained in the
way I allude to here.
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minorities. Instead of providing a tool to lessen inequality, legal mechanisms, which create the legal identity of the discrimination victim, maintain divisions between the powerful and the powerless by means that are
obscured by the ideology of equal protection. [p. 2]
These means include primarily "dialectical exchanges between victims
and oppressors ... [in which] individuals acquiesce in discrimination
struggles by acc,epting the 'invisible bonds of the victim': exclusion,
sacrifice, and distortion" (p. 3). By exclusion, Bumiller means that
victims "are often signifiers of what the dominant culture sees as evil";
by sacrifice, she means willing submission to victimization through
some combination of guilt and mistaken martyrdom; by distortion, she
means apparently irrational behavior by victims which is actually "a
powerful mechanism for survival" (pp. 72-77). In other words, antidiscrimination law creates an expectation that victims will recognize
and protest their bad treatment. When the victims refuse to fight
either because they anticipate losing more than they might gain or
because their character has been warped by the experience of victimization, they add the burden of guilt and frustration to the burdens of
poverty and bias they already endure. The book is an extended examination of this irony (without, unfortunately, any hint of leavening
from ironic humor).
The Civil Rights Society begins with several standard critiques of
civil rights law. It first describes "the civil rights consciousness" the common perception that the problem of race is best understood as
Gunnar Myrdal's "American dilemma" and that its solution lies in
"the power of the law ultimately to change discriminatory attitudes
and behavior" (p. 4). This consciousness derives from a "model of
legal protection" based on the fourteenth amendment, which has produced at least two harmful effects. First, the courts have used antidiscrimination law as much to limit as to extend governmental authority
to eradicate bias. Second, Americans have learned to view the legal
order as distinct from and superior to the political and social realm,
thereby "creat[ing] the illusion that law is a source of power and authority disconnected from other power structures in society" (p. 10).
In a second critique of civil rights law, Bumiller points out that
"progressive" "legal elites" have developed "process theory" to show
the Supreme Court how to "broaden the scope of antidiscrimination
doctrine" without contravening democratic authority (p. 11). The
goal of process theory is to show that judicial decisionmaking is neutral - therefore good, from a liberal perspective - and should be
allowed to change structures of choice and decisionmaking in ways
that benefit the disadvantaged. It invokes procedures to. make substantive changes (pp. 11-13). Despite its progressive intentions, however, process theory's main effects have been to drain the "moral
urgency" from the "political discourse of the civil rights society" (p.
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11) and to "inhibit[]" the courts' efforts to "move toward greater
equality" for disadvantaged groups (p. 12).
Finally, Bumiller argues for "the full recognition of the rights of
social groups" as well as of discrete individuals, argues against relying
on litigation to end inequality and discrimination, and provides a sample of the "overwhelming evidence that the enforcement of antidiscrimination policies has been a dismal failure" (pp. 14, 19-21, 2526).
None of this is new or particularly illuminating. What is distinctive about this book, as Bumiller points out, is that radical criticisms
seldom. "examin[e] the law in the context of everyday struggles" (p.
21). After a (mercifully) brief ramble through Mannheim's definition
of ideology, Marcuse's discussion of repression; and Foucault's theory
of law as power (pp. 30-33), The Civil Rights Society finally arrives at
its destination: intensive interviews with eighteen men and women
who perceive themselves to be victims of racial, gender, or age discrimination in employment.
This research has methodological flaws, in particular the absence
of a comparable group of people who face conflict and frustration in
their jobs that they do not ascribe to discrimination. Without such a
group, we can conclude nothing about whether the failure to take legal
action against discrimination is responsible for the distinctive effects
- sacrifice, exclusion, and distortion - Bumiller found among her
interview subjects. That is, if young white men who do not receive the
pay or promotions they think they deserve also react like Bumiller's
subjects by withdrawing from the conflict and squelching their anger,
then this story is about powerlessness and hierarchy, not about discrimination and civil rights law. Conversely, if young white men react
to or feel differently about experiences analogous to those of minorities, then Bumiller's claims about the. distinctive consequences of antidiscrimination law become very powerful. As it is, we simply do not
know how young white men denied advancement act or why, so we do
not know what to infer from the results she reports.
Another flaw in Bumiller's analysis is her failure to provide an independent judgment, or information from which readers can conclude
for themselves, about the extent of discrimina#on her interviewees suffered. I noted this problem after reading, at the end of a detailed and
moving description of age discrimination against a would-be department store saleswoman, that the respondent was seventy-six years old
at the time she was refused a job (pp. 53-55). Trying to analyze my
surprise, I realized that I had been assuming the victim to be in her
fifties or even sixties. My point is not that employers may legitimately
refuse to hire almost-octagenarians (perhaps they may not); my point
is rather that Bumiller asks us to assume that all claimants of discrimination are equally oppressed. That cannot be assumed. If Bumiller's
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goal is to examine only the psychological and behavioral consequences
of perceptions of discrimination, this concern is irrelevant. But if she
wants to analyze the consequences of discrimination tout court, as
though there is a single identifiable thing called "discrimination," she
owes us a definition and some discussion of tl~e relationship between
perceptions and the thing itself.
Nevertheless, we can set aside these questions about just what The
Civil Rights Society aims to accomplish in order to focus more directly
on what it actually says. Here my complaint is different: The book
provides too little of the engrossing and very powerful interviews. A
naive quantitative measure suggests the problem. Of the 117 -pages of
text, only six are devoted exclusively to the respondents' stories and
only an additional twenty analyze their reactions to their experie11ces.
To make the point differently, Bumiller mainly analyzes the three distinctive features of victims - exclus.ion, sacrifice, and distortion through "secondary soqrces ... [containing] accounts of persons subjected to extreme·:~ '. victimization," such a.S slaves and concentration
camp prisoners (pp. 71-72). Would it not have been more appropriate
and more interesting to make the views of her subjects the central
component of this discussion?
,
.
I intend this criticism as a back-handed compliment. Those pages
that do report and analyze the victims' ang~r, helplessness, courage,
and sheer power of endurance are simply wonderfµl. They' alone m~e
it worth plowing through the rest of the book. But I am frustrated by
thoughts of what remains unharvested from the interView transcripti;.
Despite my frustration, the varied respop.ses of these victims help
illustrate the contention that the study of Americaµ race relations can
jar conventional assumptions about "what goes with what.'~ Three
features of The Civil Rights Society can serve as examples of this contention. Consider first its subjects. On the one hand, they are victims,
and in that role they demonstrate all kinds of weakness. They exaggerate their bosses' power and capriciousness; they occasionally erupt
in unproductive violence; they possess a false consciousness, suffering
from both "an illusion of choice" (p. 59) and a "limited imagination"
(p. 76); they are dependent, docile, confused, ~d even idolatrous (p.62); they denigrate themselves; they identify with the oppressor; and
so on. On the other hand, they are people with wlion;i Bumiller empathizes and for whom she seeks respect, and in that role they demonstrate great strengths. They understand the relationship between the
self and socially ascribed personas; they love and act courageously on
behalf of their families; they teach themselves self-sufficiency; they act
generously toward other victims and even oppressors; they show pride,
dignity, and a sense of honor. In short, they demonstrate "remarkable
potential for the survival of human autonomy despite stultifying social
conditions" (p. 69).
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Bumiller here is walking a tightrope. She wants to insist both that
victimization has terrible consequences and that victims are not pitiable or terrible people. It is easy to see why a right-thinking radical
would want to have it both ways, but it is hard to do so successfully.
Can victims suffer extensive and irremediable damage and be strong
and worthy of respect? Does one claim not contradict the other? The
Civil Rights Society is not the first book to walk that tightrope, and
perhaps an understanding of how it comes to such a precarious situation will show its political and intellectual ·import.
·
For decades after the Civil War, scholars largely ignored slavery
and its consequences. In 1918, however, Ulrich Phillips published the
profoundly influential book, American Negro Slavery, in which he portrayed slaves less as the victims of a malign institution than as almost
willing recipients of a benign system of paternalistic protection. After
all, he wrote:

re-

[t]here were injustice, oppression, brutality and heartburning in the
gime, - but where in the struggling world are these absent? There were
also gentleness, kind-hearted friendship and mutual loyalty to a degree
hard for him to believe who regards the system with a theorist's eye and
a partisan squint. For him on the other hand who has known the considerate and cordial, courteous and charming men and women, white and
black, which that picturesque life in its best phases produced, it is impossible to agree that its basis and its operation were wholly evil, the law
and the prophets to the contrary notwithstanding. 2

By the mid-1950s, scholars' views had changed dramatically. Stanley
Elkins' Slavery represents the second generation of studies of black
victimization. Elkins rejected Phillips' benign view; instead his work
was so suffused with white liberal guilt over the horror of slavery that
it portrayed the slave as a completely victimized "Sambo":
Sambo, the typical plantation slave, was docile but irresponsible, loyal
but lazy, humble but chronically given to lying and stealing; his behavior
was full of infantile silliness and his talk inflated with childish exaggeration. His relationship with his master was one of utter dependence and
childlike attachment: it was indeed this childlike quality that was the
very key to his being. 3

Elkins assured his readers that not every slave was a Sambo and that
Sambo-like qualities were not racially based. Indeed, his famous analogy between American slavery and Nazi concentration camps was
designed as much to show that infantilism is not race-specific as that
slavery was as bad as the Holocaust. But the overall impression left by
Slavery was that African-Americans were helpless and dependent.
2. u. PHILLIPS, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 514 (1918). My characterization of Phillips,
as of Elkins and the other authors discussed here, is too condensed to do justice to the nuances of
their writing. It nevertheless, I hope, captures the essence of their arguments.
3. S. ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL
LIFE 82 (1959).
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Much of the history of slavery and its consequences written during
the 1960s and 1970s can be read- too schematically, to be sure- as
a choice between these two equally unacceptable models of victimization. Scholars could argue, with Phillips, that contemporary AfricanAmericans are not psychologically and socially damaged because slavery was not really so awful after all. Or they could argue, with Elkins,
that American slavery was so horrific that slaves (and therefore their
descendants) were devastatingly and irreparably damaged. Very
roughly speaking, Daniel Patrick Moynihan's The Negro Family can
be seen as a successor to Elkins, and Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman's Time on the Cross serves as a successor to Phillips, without
the racism and perhaps only with regard to the material circumstances
of slaves.4
The third generation, intellectually if not temporally, of "victimization scholars" sought to escape these poles. Eugene Genovese's
Roll, Jordan, Roll and Herbert Gutman's The Black Family in Slavery
and Freedom best exemplify the having-it-both-ways school of thought
to which Bumiller belongs. 5 They, like she, wanted to argue both that
slavery and racial discrimination were intolerably oppressive and that
slaves and their descendants survived the oppression with dignity,
strength, and moral rectitude. Genovese's discussion of slaves' "acceptance" of slavery shows this 'balancing act in process:
The slaves defended themselves effectively against the worst of their masters' aggression, but they paid a high price. They fought for their right
to think and act as autonomous human beings, but it was a desperate
fight in which they could easily slip backward. . . . Most found ways to
develop and assert their manhood and womanhood despite the dangerous compromises forced upon them. They had manifested strength. But
... the intersection of paternalism with racism worked a catastrophe, for
it transformed elements of personal dependency into a sense of collective
weakness. 6

It is important to clarify the precise nature of Genovese's (and Bumiller's) high-wire act. It is not a search for an Aristotelian mean; Genovese did not say that slaves' deep dependence combined with their
assertive separatism to produce an appropriately interdependent community. He and Bumiller make the much more interesting and complicated argument that slaves and their descendants were at once
deeply dependent and proudly autonomous. The precarious balance
consists in giving approximately equal emphasis to two contradictory
arguments rather than combining them or trading them off against one
4. Moynihan, The Negro Family: The Case for National Actlon, in THE MOYNIHAN REPORT
AND THE POLITICS OF CoNTROVERSY (L. Rainwater & W. Yancey eds. 1967); R. FOGEL &
ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE EcONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1974).

s.

5. E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1972); H. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1750-1925 (1976).

6. E. GENOVESE, supra note 5, at 148-49.
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another to yield a conclusion somewhere in between. 7
Orlando Patterson's and Glenn Loury's twin Public Interest articles, "The Moral Crisis of the Black American," and "The Moral
Quandary of the Black Community," respectively, best represent the
fourth generation of this scholarship. Both argue (Patterson with
more elegance and analytic rigor) that African-Americans must, to be
full moral agents, reject all claims as victims and accept responsibility
for their past as well as their future. As Patterson put it:
There can be no moral equality where there is a dependency relationship
among men; there will always be a dependency relationship where the
victim strives for equality by vainly seeking the assistance of his victimizer. No oppressor can ever respect such a victim, whatever he may do
for him, including the provision of complete economic equality. In situations like these we can expect sympathy, even magnanimity from men,
but never - and it is unfair to expect otherwise - the genuine respect
which one equal feels for another. 8

Loury agrees:
The pride and self-respect valued by aspiring peoples throughout the
world cannot be the gift of outsiders - they must derive from the
thoughts and deeds of the peoples themselves. Neither the guilt nor the
pity of one's oppressor is a sufficient basis upon which to construct a
sense of self-worth.9

In Loury's hands, this claim takes the form of the traditional conservative plea for self-help and abjuration of dependence on government hand-outs. In Patterson's hands, the same claim takes a tum
toward support for "constructive public rebellion," by which blacks
and other ethnic groups with "a potentially common class interest"
create "a total, almost revolutionary change in American society." 10
The politics of victimization does indeed make strange bedfellows.
The point of this brief review is not to argue for one or another of
these schools (although the older I get, the more compelling I find
Patterson's combination of tough-minded cultural conservatism and
expansive economic radicalism). Here I make only the preliminary
point that the whole issue of victimization is politically and morally
unsettling. Can one claim to be deeply victimized and still reject selfpity and patronization? Can one claim responsibility for the future
7. I am blurring the distinction between slavery and post·Civil War race relations for two
reasons. First, my concern is the analytic question of how to think about victimization, not the
historical question of how victimization and victims changed over time. Second, although many
of the books I describe focused on slavery, they had an implicit (and sometimes explicit) goal of
interpreting artd c0mmenting on contemporary race relations. Thus, the distinction between
slavery and post-war race relations is often less important in scholarly practice than in theory. In
short, my claim is not that Bumiller is contributing to the history of slavery - she obviously is
not - but rather that the ways historians have thought about slavery and its aftermath give us a
context for understanding her work.
8. Patterson, The Moral Crisis of the Black American, 32 PUB. INTEREST 43, 52 (1973).
9. Loury, The Moral Quandary of the Black Community, 79 PUB. INTEREST 9, 11 (1985).
10. Patterson, supra note 8, at 68.
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without accepting blame for the past? Is the radical claim of black
power really the same as the conservative demand for self-help? More
precisely, if outside intervention prolongs dependency, must liberals
and radicals renounce any efforts to aid victims - thus joining conservative calls for governmental inaction?
Bumiller is maddeningly vague on these and similar questions.
Despite her wide-ranging reviews of various theoretical and historical
literatures, she never refers to the history of victimization studies. 11
Thus she ignores the issue of whether the tightrope she walks can
carry her either to a description of victims who are bloodied but unbowed, or to a prescription for intervention that is potent but not patronizing. As Bumiller, calling on Foucault as a model for
understanding but not prescribing, puts it, her book offers "no new
'expert' advice about liberation strategies" (p. 113).
Given Bumiller's express renunciation of prescription, it is perhaps
unfair to press the point much further. Nevertheless, I will do so,
since escape from the status of victim is so important and so intellectually complex. Here is the second way in which The Civil Rights Society induces us to rethink "what goes with what." Bumiller first
appears to agree with Patterson and Loury that. victims must make
their own future, since she concludes the sentence just quoted with
"but I project a revisionist view t4at allows subjects to reexamine their
fate" (p. 113). However, she also calls for a reformulation of the underpinnings of civil rights law:
[C]ontemporary society ... can begin to recreate a language of rights
that responds to the struggles and needs of those who experience social
and economic disadvantage. . . .
·
. . . . [W]e need to begin the search for a restatement of rights that
abandons the objectivity and individuality of current doctrine and that
recognizes the. interests of social groups and individuals. People who .
possess salient group identities need to find in the law reinforcement for
the expression of their individual selves and positive referents for the
qualities they share as a collectivity. [pp. 112, 116]
Bumiller's hint of prescription may be correct, although it IS hard to
tell just what it means without further development. But whatever its
virtues, it places liberation not in the hands of those to be liberated,
but in the hands of legal scholars and lawmakers - just the people
responsible for victimization to begin with (if Genovese and Bumiller
are right), and just the people who cannot, despite the best intentions,
liberate victims (if Patterson and Loury are right):
My point here is neither to criticize Bumiller nor prescribe myself,
but rather to show once again how this book forces· us to ·confront our
desire to join perhaps incompatible claims. Can one consistently argue
11. Bumiller also makes no referenee to a ·roughly analogous line of research in feminist
theory and gender studies.
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both that liberal law and politics deeply oppress racial minorities and
women and that the law presents opportunities to these victims to liberate themselves? I am not sure, and the contortions that Genovese,
Gutman, and Bumiller all occasionally engage in suggest that they too
are not sure. Similarly, can one claim both that victims must liberate
themselves and that elites must radically reform political and legal
structures in order to liberate victims? Again, neither I nor Bumiller,
who ducks the issue, is sure.1 2
A third way, probably inadvertent, in which this book jars our
conventional assumptions was suggested earlier but warrants closer attention. Glenn Loury is typically labeled a neoconservative; Orlando
Patterson is economically radical but culturally conservative; Kristin
Bumiller presumably thinks of herself as a radical critic from the left.
Yet their arguments have striking similarities. Each argues that the
American legal system perpetuates victimization, that victims must
liberate themselves, and that liberation requires radical reformulation
of the links among individuals, groups, and society. While I earlier
suggested ways in which commonly joined assumptions warrant separation, here my point is that conventionally separated political views
may be closely connected. The Civil Rights Society, whatever else it
does or does not do, deserves praise for inducing us to rethink "what
goes with what."
The penultimate paragraph of Bumiller's book rather surprisingly
provides a transition to Harold Cruse's Plural But Equal Bumiller
warns:
We are currently experiencing ... a proliferation of antidiscrimination
strategies. Such proliferation can be seen as the logical extension of the
universalization of rights - by including all groups, it further dilutes the
benefits received by the historically most disadvantaged groups. . . .
[U]niversalization of rights has led to increasing tensions between racial,
ethnic, and feminist groups. Spokespersons for black interests, who fear
that proliferation of rights will dissolve their minimal gains, have begun
to object to civil rights strategies that fail to give priority to disadvantaged blacks. [p. 117]

Here is where Cruse begins. In a long, rambling set of repetitive ruminations and sharp insights, Cruse takes on the NAACP, liberal Jews,
feminists, white ethnics, Asians and Latinos, Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Jesse Jackson, Brown v. Board ofEducation, and other targets - all in
defense of the special claims of blacks against those who would deny
their uniqueness or be parasitic on their strength.
Plural But Equal covers a lot of ground. One theme was just suggested: an attack on groups other than African-Americans for trying
to squeeze under the umbrella of black-led civil rights agitation and
12. Patterson and Loury are sure, and their answer is "no." See Patterson, supra note 8, at
68-69; Loury, supra note 9, at 11.
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legislation. Cruse has sharp words for white ethnics and feminists (of
both races) who claim the same entitlement to relieffor past harms but
who, he claims, have suffered nowhere near the same degree of oppression as blacks (especially men). As he puts it, in the first of many such
passages:
[B]lacks were the unabashed catalysts behind the ethnic consciousness
aroused in the Sixties. Who was stopping the white ethnics from seeking
constitutional redress of grievances before the Brown decision? Nothing
or no one but the plain fact that white ethnics had no real constitutional
argument in the first place! . . .
. . . White ethnics did not need the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, or a hundred years of litigation and court decisions, to legitimize their social status. And when one examines the
pantheon of American achievers ... and finds ... numerous ... decidedly un-WASPish luminaries, it means that the American Dream was
not always the sleepless nightmare of nonrecognition that inspired Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream." 13

Furthermore, Cruse points out bitterly, "European immigrants remained, for the most part, socially distant if not hostile to blacks" (p.
56). He is no more enamored of feminists, who refuse to see that
"equalizing political and economic rights according to gender means
undermining the political and economic rights of nonwhite minority
groups" (p. 364-65).
Another theme in Plural But Equal is an historical account of how
African-Americans have arrived at their current impasse - without a
strong leader, a coherent program, or popular support. Cruse argues
that the Du Bois-Washington debate over political integration versus
separate economic development has been the prototype for all important conflicts among blacks in the twentieth century. The book traces
the development of this conflict from the origins of the NAACP,
through its legal maneuvering over school desegregation, and up to the
implications of "noneconomic liberalism" for Jesse Jackson and the
urban underclass. It portrays the NAACP, and black and liberal
white elites more generally, as misleading and even betraying the black
masses by insisting over and over on legalisms and integration rather
than on autonomous political, economic, and cultural development.
Cruse is especially acrimonious about the historical role of Jewish
board members and financial supporters of the NAACP who provided
"debilitating leadership" by creating and· insisting upon "the guiding
white philosophy of noneconomic liberalism" (p. 79).
A third theme of Plural But Equal is an internecine argument
among black political , activists. Cruse sees plenty of blame to go
around. In addition to feminists, Jews, and ethnic revivalists, he castigates black neoconservatives for censuring ghetto dwellers, black civil
13. P. 57. Emphasis is in the original in all quotes from Cruse unless otherwise noted.
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rights leaders for single-minded assimilationism, Martin Luther King,
Jr. for opposing black power and wasting his moral capital on the
Vietnam War, and Jesse Jackson for political cowardice. Quoting a
few of Cruse's critiques may suggest the flavor of this book. On King:
He "had been led, unwisely, to compromise his established civil rights
legitimacy by taking a public stand against the Vietnam War.... The
catch here was that the privileges of equal citizenship carried with
them an equal obligation to fight America's wars, whether these wars
were considered just or unjust" (p. 260). On Jackson's 1984 presidential campaign: "[I]n his haste for the laurels of political notoriety ...
Jesse Jackson squandered too much of his potential by opportunistically following the imaginary bait of electoral politics at the presidential summit, while neglecting the more crucial and fundamental and
obligatory talk of political organization at the bottom, the independent
black political party" (p. 386). And most important, on the NAACP:
[T]he NAACP's program became increasingly irrelevant in the
Seventies. . . .
'
... The NAACP could not return to past polices and principles to
regain clarity of leadership in the present and future, since it was precisely its past policies and principles that hopelessly trapped it in its contemporary programmatic crisis.... [T]he NAACP could have redeemed
its flagging prestige and legitimacy by ... encouraging the National
Black Political Convention movement to pursue the organizational possibilities of the independent black political thrust. . . . [Instead it] maintained the prerogative to discourage and delegitimize black ideological
departures not consistent with its leadership ideologies. [pp. 357-59]

What unifies all these attacks, and raises the book from a cranky
jeremiad to occasional eloquence and power, are the two goals that
Cruse is arguing/or. He seeks to reclaim the despised concept of "separate but equal" by recasting it as "plural but equal," and to foster
"cooperative economic organization" in aid of poor blacks. His constituencies, in other words, are appropriately nationalistic AfricanAmericans and poor African-Americans. Let us consider each argument in tum.
.
Cruse's most concrete discussion of "plural but equal" lies in the
arena of school desegregation. He points out that school desegregation in the South following Brown made black teachers and principals
"superfluous." Instead of endorsing "discrete implementation of the
principles of local control [and] the elimination of public school segregation by law, while allowing the parental option of voluntary choice
of local school enrollment," Cruse argues, the "irresponsible and romantic black leadership" allowed the nebulous issue of integration to
eliminate "one of the natural foundations of political leverage in the
coming struggle for black political power" (p. 249). In short, Cruse
apparently agrees with the white Southern stance that dominated the
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years from Little Rock to Green v. County School Board: 14 namely,
that no matter what the Supreme Court says, parents do and ought to
have the right to send their children to whatever local public school
they wish. Black opposition to mandatory school desegregation is not
new, but such a strong statement of that view still startles those of us
brought up to believe that support for desegregation was a rough-andready indicator of commitment to racial equality.
Cruse's slogan of "plural but equal" goes beyond separate schools
and an independent black political party. At its broadest, it calls on
"the minority group ... to organize its own economic, political, and
cultural potential for a showdown across the bargaining table to obtain
an equal share of the resources of any society" (p. 252). This call is
also not new; Cruse, after all, issues it in the midst of a discussion of
the Black Power movement of the 1960s. But it is a striking claim,
especially in the contemporary political context.
Plural But Equal's other deep commitment is to "economic cooperative organization" (p. 340) - otherwise known as socialism in one
community. Here he is especially concerned about "the magnified
black millions of the Eighties existing below the poverty line, whom
the nation and its uplift forces and agencies cannot rescue" (p. 383).
They need not "myths surrounding . . . equal protection regarding
race and economics in a free-market," but "collective enterprises
among blacks, ... collective determination ... in cooperative economic
efforts" (p. 384). Cruse's commitment to poor blacks generates some
of his most eloquent passages excoriating middle-class blacks for their
"creation of empty slogans"; their "puny ... intellectual, scholarly
and creative output"; and their development as a "mindless ... empty
class" that lacks "a clearly defined social mission" and that fails to
recognize the need for nationalism and intraracial cooperation (pp.
384, 389).
I have quoted so extensively from Plural But Equal for two reasons. First, Cruse is so wordy that it is impossible to briefly articulate
his views in his own words. Second ano more important, whatever
value the book has lies in its political agenda and rousing polemics, not
in its substantive arguments or analytic rigor. And only the author
himself can adequately convey that agenda and tone. There is no
point in examining Plural But Equal in the same way we examined
The Civil Rights Society, by placing it within a scholarly literature or
querying its logical and methodological rigor. Plural But Equal is not
that kind of book, and could not stand up to that kind of analysis.
Instead, we should look at it as the opening salvo in a new round of
debate over 'the value and content of black nationalism.
14. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In Cruse's words, free choice plans "ought to have been implemented at the very outset of school desegregation no matter what the Brown decision said ...."
P. 249.
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It is in this context that Cruse's book most strongly challenges our
assumptions about "what goes with what." White liberals intuitively,
but vaguely, see black n~tionalism as a movement of the left, similar to
and allied with feminism, opposition to the Vietnam War, sympathy
for undocumented immigrants, and hostility to white separatists.
They tend also to see Booker T. Washington as a conservative apologist for Jim Crow, and W.E.B. Du Bois as a radical exponent of black
pride and black Marxism. Plural But Equal belies all those vague intuitions. Cruse is hostile to feminism, whether black or white, because
it contributes to the denial of black men's "option to play out the role of
man of the household" (p. 369). He is no more hospitable to new immigrants than to old ones, since "in the Far West, . . . black populations [are] practically lost in a melange of Asians and Latinos, all
prevailing and countervailing for minority handouts from the golden
pot of the American Dream" (p. 360). Cruse remembers the Vietnam
War mainly as a diversion of King's attention from more important
concerns about black power and black economic development. He retrospectively agrees with Southern resisters that the proper response to
Brown should have been parental freedom of choice within a de jure
desegregated school system. He sees Washington as the precursor of
cooperative economic development, and Du Bois (at least before 1934)
as elitist and assimilationist. None of this will seem new to veterans of
the black nationalist debate since the 1960s. 15 But I predict that, beyond that small and rather incestuous world, most whites and some
blacks will be confounded by Cruse's disavowal of what are to many
liberals almost canonical affiliations.
It would be less than honest to ignore the simple fact that Plural
But Equal is not a very good book. It is repetitive, unfocused, and
self-indulgent. Although they are mercifully few, such sentences as
"[i]n retrospect, the Seventies would unfold as the transitional decade
leading to the fateful 1980s" (p. 269) are hard to overlook. Cruse does
not understand aggregate data analysis but makes the mistake of challenging its use and interpretation. The whole book needs severe editing and some effort at systematic organization. I was originally
annoyed at its lack of a table of contents and substantive section and
chapter titles, the absence of which tends to disorient the reader. I
decided by the end that this lack was not an oversight, but rather an
indication of the despair that someone (whether author or editor) must
have felt in trying to decide just what each section and chapter was
about.
Nevertheless, I am reluctant to criticize Cruse's book too severely,
and not only out of respect for the man who twenty years ago wrote
15. For a very useful description of the internecine debates among black nationalists in the
1960s and 1970s, see Marable, Black Nationalism in the 1970s: Through the Prism of Race and
Class, SOCIALIST REV., Mar.-June 1980, at 57.
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Crisis of the Negro Intellectual If this book represents more than the
idiosyncratic views of one emeritus professor - if it really does signal
a resurgence of black nationalism after the assimilationist quiescence
of the 1970s and 1980s - then its arguments are very important no
matter how poorly presented. No one can predict when or to what
degree black nationalism will revive. But given the twentieth century's
unremitting tension between nationalism (represented by Marcus Garvey, Malcolm X, and Imamu Baraka) and integrationism (represented
by the NAACP and National Urban League), we can confidently predict that it will revive. 16 And if common reports of strains between
black and white feminists, 17 between blacks and new immigrants, 18
and between blacks and Jews 19 represent more than authorial sensationalism, then Cruse's suspicion of the "me too's" and snakes-in-thegrass must be taken very seriously as an indicator, if not a fomenter, of
mutual recriminations.
From the outside (as a white Jewish female), I am not persuaded
that a small, poor, and relatively powerless minority should pursue a
nationalism that pushes away all potential allies. Such a strategy
seems self-defeating at best. But from the inside - if Cruse represents
the inside - that form of nationalism is logically and emotionally
compelling. And regardless of one's perspective, Americans of all
races and persuasions should find Plural But Equal a valuable guide to
contemporary black nationalist sentiments.
It is perhaps banal, but nevertheless important, to conclude that a
book shows us how left and right have more in common than either
side, or most observers, believe. Both Plural But Equal and The Civil
Rights Society present themselves as far to the left of mainstream
American politics. Yet both concur in major arguments with those
they would probably include among the enemy. My point is not that
they are mistaken or inconsistent; we can easily see how each book's
own frame of reference leads it to this apparently odd position. My
16. Adolph Reed argues that African-American scholars and activists must transcend the
distinction between integrationism and nationalism since it reflects "a narrow focus on racial
tactics and .•. [a] penchant for ahistorical dualism." See A. Reed, The Political Thought of
W.E.B. Du Bois: Liberal Collectivism and Elite Consolidation Among Afro-Americans (1988)
(unpublished manuscript). I agree, but this is not the place to pursue that discussion, since Cruse
sticks closely to the traditional dichotomy.
17. See, e.g.. B. HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING F'EMINisr; THINKING BLACK 177-83
(1989). A more illuminating study of tensions within feminism, focusing in this case on His- .
panic-Anglo relations, is Lugones & Spelman, Have We Got a Theory for You! Feminist Theory,
Cultural Imperialism, and the Demand for "The Woman's Voice," 6 WOMEN'S STUD. INTL. F.
573 (1983).
18. See, e.g., Schmalz, Dreams and Despair Collide as Miami Searches for Itself, N.Y. Times,,
Jan. 23, 1989, at Al, col. 2; Salholz, A Conflict of the Have-Nots, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 12, 1988, at
28-29.
19. See J. KAUFMAN, BROKEN ALLIANCE: THE TURBULENT TIMES BETWEEN BLACKS
AND JEWS IN AMERICA (1988); Kramer, Blacks and Jews: How Wide the Rift?, NEW YORK,
Feb. 4, 1985, at 26-32.
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point is rather that the fundamental contradiction between the fact of
racial subordination and the American ideology of freedom and opportunity pushes all careful thinkers into positions that seem anomalous from some perspective. That was certainly the case for Thomas
Jefferson20 and Hinton Rowan Helper21 ; it is equally the case for Bumiller and Cruse. In different ways, these two books lead us once
again to face that contradiction and to realize how much responsibility
it bears for the peculiarities of American political thought and
practice.
The juxtaposition of these two books suggests a final way in which
they make us rethink comfortable assumptions. Just who are the victims, or the most victimized? Cruse's answer, over and over, is
"blacks," especially poor blacks. · Bumiller's implicit answer is
"blacks, Latinos, white women, and the elderly" - everyone who can
attribute their subordination to ascriptive categories. Her interviews
elide precisely the differences among types of victims or degrees of
victimization that Cruse wants to insist upon. I can imagine a conversation between Bumiller and Cruse in which each accuses the other of
inappropriate special pleading for some victims at the expense of other
equally worthy ones.
Awarding the prize of "most victimized" to any particular group
seems to me a bootless enterprise. But my imagined dialogue between
Bumiller and Cruse should alert us to the political and psychological
stakes attendant on the question of which victims deserve what kind of
treatment. However one arrays people along the dimension of victimization (including the refusal to engage in such an exercise), one can
responsibly do so only by realizing that one's allies and enemies will be
disconcertingly different than one anticipated. For that important insight, we have The Civil Rights Society and Plural But Equal to thank.

20. See J. MILLER, THE WOLF BY THE EARS: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND SLAVERY (1977).
21. H. HELPER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE SOUTH (1963) (1st ed. 1857).

